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UCPR r 250 – orders relating to “property” – whether sperm extracted and stored may be 
characterised as “property” – whether court has jurisdiction to make orders for retention and 
preservation – whether rights could attach and vest in personal representatives 
In Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 118 an order was made under r 250 of the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) requiring the respondent to continue to hold and 
maintain straws of semen belonging to the applicant’s deceased husband.  
The decision includes a useful analysis of the development of the common law regarding property 
rights in human bodies and body parts. 
Facts 
In July 2009 the applicant’s then de facto partner, Warren Bazley, was diagnosed with liver cancer. 
The couple married in December 2009. They had one child, born February 2009, and had made 
statements indicating an intention to have more children. Mr Bazeley had provided a semen sample 
to the respondent on 28 July 2009. The semen was to be stored by the respondent for a fee.   
By his will made in December 2009, Mr Bazley appointed the applicant and his accountant as the 
executors and trustees of his will. The applicant was the principal beneficiary of the estate, with 
provision also made for each of Mr Bazley’s children. No directive had been given about the 
posthumous use of his sperm. 
Mr Bazley died on 7 January 2010. In late January 2010 the applicant informed the respondent of her 
husband’s death and requested that the respondent continue to store Mr Bazley’s sperm. The 
response on behalf of the respondent was to the effect that, in the absence of specific reproductive 
and assisted technology legislation in Queensland, the respondent operated in accordance with the 
National Health and Medical Research Council Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research.  
The letter indicated that these Guidelines prohibited the storage of gametes from a deceased person 
where there was no written directive from the deceased giving consent to the use of the gamates. 
The respondent advised that in the absence of such a directive, the respondent was prevented from 
continuing to store Mr Bazley’s sperm and using it in a treatment procedure to procure a pregnancy. 
The applicant applied to the Supreme Court of Queensland, by originating application, for orders 
which included an order requiring the respondent to continue to hold and maintain the straws of Mr 
Bazley’s semen, and an order restraining the respondent from destroying those straws until further 
order. 
Legislation 
Rule 250(1) of the UCPR provides: 
 
The court may make an order for the inspection, detention, custody or preservation of property if – 
(a) The property is the subject of a proceeding or is property about which a question may 
arise in a proceeding; or 
(b) Inspection of the property is necessary for deciding an issue in a proceeding.  
 Section 8 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) provides, so far as is relevant: 
(1) A person may dispose by will of any property to which the person is entitled at the time of 
the person’s death. 
... 
(3) A person may dispose by will of any property to which the person’s personal representative 
becomes entitled, in the person’s capacity as personal representative, after the person’s 
death. 
Under s 36 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), “asset” is defined as including “property of any 
type”, and “property” is defined as meaning: “any legal or equitable estate or interest (whether 
present or future, vested or contingent, or tangible or intangible) in real or personal property of any 
description (including money), and includes things in action.” 
Issues 
The issues for determination in the proceeding were whether sperm extracted and stored could be 
described as “property” (in which case certain rights may attach and vest in personal 
representatives), and whether the Court had jurisdiction to make an order of the kind sought by the 
applicant for the temporary retention and preservation of her late husband’s sperm and ultimate 
return to her or another storage facility.  
Authorities  
White J examined several relevant authorities. Her Honour observed first that at common law a 
living human body was incapable of being owned or possessed. She noted that there was ample 
authority to the effect that there can be no property in a human corpse, not even by an executor 
whose only function, vis-a-vis the body of the testator, is to bury it.  
Consideration was then given to a range of authorities which have recognised that in some 
circumstances a human body, or a portion of a human body, was capable of becoming the subject of 
property, and that the law would protect rightful possession of it by appropriate remedies. These 
authorities included: Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406; Dobson v North Tyneside Health 
Authority [1997] 1 WLR 596; R v Kelly; R v Lindsay [1999] QB 621. Each of these cases had proceeded 
on the basis that an exception could arise when a person has, by lawful exercise of work or skill, so 
dealt with a human body or part of a human body in that person’s lawful possession that it has 
acquired some attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting burial. 
In relation to the semen of a deceased man, White J examined the Californian decision of Hecht v 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Kane) (1993) 20 Cal Rptr 2d 275, where the Court of Appeal 
held there could be property in a deceased man’s semen stored ante mortem. Her Honour also 
referred to the several Queensland decisions which have considered applications for orders that a 
suitably qualified medical practitioner be given leave to extract semen from the body of a recently 
deceased husband or partner. In two of these decisions the application was refused: Re Gray 
(deceased) [2000] QSC 390; Re Baker [2003] QSC 002. The application was granted in Re Denman 
[2004] QSC 70, but only to maintain the status quo. In this case, Atkinson J was satisfied that the 
court had jurisdiction to permit that which was not unlawful, but her Honour reserved, as the 
serious question to be tried, whether spermatozoa could or should be removed from a deceased 
person for the purpose of posthumous reproduction. 
White J then discussed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Yearworth [2010] QB 1. In that case a 
number of men who had been diagnosed with cancer had accepted the invitation of hospital 
clinicians to provide samples of semen for frozen storage in the hospital’s fertility storage unit, prior 
to undergoing chemotherapy in case the treatment damaged their fertility. The hospital had, 
through breach of duty to take reasonable care in the storage of the semen samples, allowed the 
samples to perish.  
Proceedings were commenced, alleging want of care by the hospital. In the Court of Appeal, it was 
held that since the claimants had ownership of the sperm for the purposes of claims in negligence, 
they had sufficient rights in relation to it to render them capable of having been bailors of it.  It held 
that liability of the storage unit as a gratuitous bailee was established in principle. The arrangements 
with the complainants were held to be closely akin to contracts.  
The Court of Appeal noted that it could have decided the question relating to property rights by 
reference to the “work and skill” exception identified in Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406. It 
concluded, however, that developments in medical science called for a re-analysis of the common 
law’s treatment of, and approach to, the ownership of parts or products of a living human body. It 
found the distinction between the capacity to own body parts or products which have, and which 
have not, been subject to the exercise of work and skill was “not entirely logical.”  
The Court recognised that for the purposes of their claims in negligence, the men had ownership of 
the sperm which they ejaculated. The Court further held that the men had rights of property as 
bailors, which entitled them or their representatives to call for the property’s return, subject to the 
terms of the contract between them.  
Reference was also made to the decision of Master Sanderson in Roche v Douglas (2000) 22 WAR 
331.  The Master had made an order under O 52 r 3 of the Western Australian Rules of the Supreme 
Court 1971 (similar to UCPR r 250) in respect of tissue removed and stored from a testator before 
death. The order was for DNA testing, to resolved issues of paternity.  
Conclusion 
In light of the authorities examined, White J concluded that the straws of semen in question were 
property, and that their ownership vested in the deceased while alive and in his personal 
representative after his death. The relationship was one of bailor and bailee for reward. The 
arrangement could come to an end if the agreed fee was not paid or contact was not maintained as 
required, or if respondent died without leaving a written directive about the semen. However, the 
bailor, or his personal representative, maintained ownership of the straws of semen and could 
request the return of his property.  
Her Honour further concluded that it was an implied term of the contract of bailment that the 
semen would, if requested, be returned in a manner which preserved its essential characteristics as 
frozen semen capable of being used. The applicant would be responsible for any extra costs 
associated with that delivery, with the court able to impose such conditions, if necessary, under 
UCPR r 250. 
The orders sought were made on 25 March 2010, with the reasons for the decision provided on 21 
April 2010. The orders required the respondent to continue to preserve Mr Bazley’s semen for three 
months or until earlier order, with the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the application on 
the standard basis.  
